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Abstract 8
Animal health surveillance is a complex activity that involves multiple stakeholders and provides 9 decision support across sectors. Despite progress in the design of surveillance systems, some technical 10 challenges remain, specifically for emerging hazards. Surveillance can also be impacted by political 11 interests and costly consequences of case reporting, particularly in relation to international trade. 12
Constraints on surveillance can therefore be of technical, economic and political nature. From an 13 economic perspective, both surveillance and intervention are resource-using activities that are part of 14 a mitigation strategy. Surveillance provides information for intervention decisions and thereby helps 15 to offset negative effects of animal disease and to reduce the decision uncertainty associated with 16 choices on disease control. It thus creates monetary and non-monetary benefits, both of which may 17 be challenging to quantify. The technical relationships between surveillance, intervention and loss 18 avoidance have not been established for most hazards despite being important consideration for 19 investment decisions. Therefore, surveillance cannot just be maximised to minimise intervention 20 costs. Economic appraisals of surveillance need to be done on a case by case basis for any hazard 21 considering both surveillance and intervention performance, the losses avoided and the values 22 attached to them. This can be achieved by using an evaluation approach which provides a systematic 23 investigation of the worth or merit of surveillance activities. Evaluation is driven by a specific 24 evaluation question which for surveillance systems commonly considers effectiveness, efficiency, 25 implementation and/or compliance issues. More work is needed to provide guidance on the 26 appropriate selection of evaluation attributes and general good practice in surveillance evaluation. 27
Due to technical challenges, economic constraints and variable levels of capacity, the implementation 28 of surveillance systems remains variable. Political and legal issues are also influential. A particular 29 challenge exists during outbreaks when surveillance needs to be conducted under emergency 30 conditions. Decision support systems can help make epidemiologically and economically sound 31 choices among surveillance options. However, contingency planning is advisable so that pre-defined 32 options allow for rapid decision making. 33
Introduction: State-of-the art in surveillance 34
Surveillance has been defined as "the ongoing collection, validation, analysis and interpretation of 35 health and disease data that are needed to inform key stakeholders in order to permit them to take 36 action by planning and implementing more effective, evidence-based public health policies and 37 strategies relevant to the prevention and control of disease or disease outbreaks" (ECDC, 2007) . 38
Although this definition was established for surveillance in the context of public health, it is largely 39 transferable to veterinary contexts. The information of stakeholders -often referred to as 40 dissemination -is an essential component of surveillance as it assures that the purpose of collecting 41 surveillance data is to inform decisions. If the last step is missing, the value of surveillance information 42 is likely to remain limited. 43
In animal health, surveillance is applied to a large number of applications. As part of a European-wide 44 research project, reviews of surveillance activities with different objectives are being conducted. Some technical challenges in the design of surveillance systems remain. Over the last years, risk-based 53 surveillance has become popular and progress in its development has been made (Stärk et al., 2006 ; 54 Cameron 2012). For some hazards, however, considerable design issues remain. Most notably, the 55 surveillance for antimicrobial resistance continues to challenge surveillance system design at multiple 56 levels. First, it is not clear what the unit of analysis should be. We could focus on certain phenotypes 57 of pathogens which exhibit defined resistance patterns against specific antimicrobials. However, some 58 genetic elements are mobile and can be exchanged between bacteria of different species. Thus, EFSA 59 suggests that the focus should rather be at the gene level (EFSA, 2011). Due to the almost unlimited 60 number of combinations between host species, bacteria species and antimicrobial substances, priority 61 setting is a paramount need. Some attempts have been made, but are quickly outdated also due to 62 the rapid progress in diagnostic possibilities. Next generation sequencing is now much more widely 63 available and may well become the tool of choice in the near future. However, statistical tools, 64 sampling frameworks and surveillance designs have yet to adapt to this new situation. And until 65 international standards will integrate these new methods, even more time -possibly years -will be 66 needed. 67
The emergence of Schmallenberg virus in the European Union in 2011 (Afonso et al., 2014 ) is a good 68 example to illustrate both strengths and limitations of surveillance systems at present (Roberts et al., 69 2014 ). The first signal of the outbreak came from performance recordings on dairy farms. This could 70 be seen as a successful application of syndromic surveillance, a relatively recent approach to 71 surveillance where unspecific signals such as performance, body temperature, abortion rates or 72 mortality are used to trigger investigations at an early stage of an outbreak (Vial & Berezowski, 2014) . 73
In the case of this incident, a previously unknown virus was isolated as part of the investigations and 74 disease control measures were taken based on a tentative case definition. Using a metagenomics 75 approach, a novel viral agent was identified (Beer et al., 2013) . Emergency risk assessments were 76 conducted with emphasis on both animal and public health. The development of diagnostic 77 procedures was very rapid with only 3 months until validation and commercialisation; mass-screening 78 kits were available within five months. The development of a legal status for Schmallenberg, however, 79 took longer and remained variable across Europe. While some countries made it notifiable, others did 80 not. It was highlighted that disease control policy should be such that early reporting of unusual cases 81
is not penalised (Anonymous, 2012; Beer et al., 2013) . 82
The Schmallenberg example also illustrates the close links between surveillance and disease control 83 as described by Häsler et al. (2011 A dispute settlement process is in place to address disagreements on trade restrictions. This system is 102 now well established, and although it appears to be generally working, economic and political factors 103 do remain active and influential in trade decisions. However, not all countries are member of the WTO, 104 but the wast majority of major trade partners are. 105
Constraints on surveillance can therefore be of technical, economic and political nature. Consider two 106 countries, one with a very effective surveillance in place which duly reports outbreaks at an early 107 stage, and another, with limited surveillance and therefore less ability to detect outbreaks. In the 108 latter, some diseases may go undetected for a long time while trade still continues. This can have wide 109 reaching consequences in the long run, if losses are higher than if control started earlier. However, 110
short-term economic interests, fear of loss of reputation and other factors may still provide incentives 111 for non-reporting. This is also true at the farm level where reporting decisions may be influenced by 112 compensation as well as the fear of discrimination and stigmatisation. 113
The aim of this article is to consider technical, economic and political contraints and their impact on 114 surveillance. We also aim to provide an overview of recent methodological and conceptual 115 developments indicating progress in the 116
Economics of surveillance 117
In economic terms, animal production systems exist to provide goods or services to people in society, 118 such animal source foods, wool, and leather, animals kept as companions, used for sport, work, or 119 research. However, animal disease reduces the economic benefit people gain from animals, poses a 120 threat to human health because of foodborne and zoonotic diseases and uses resources that in the 121 absence of disease could be allocated to alternative purposes and therefore have an opportunity cost. 122
The economic cost of animal disease is of growing concern given increasing international trade, 123 changes in production practices fuelled by changes in lifestyle across the world, and changing 124 environmental conditions. 125
Both surveillance and intervention are resource-using activities that are part of a mitigation strategy. as peace of mind, feelings of safety when a hazard is absent, freedom from fear, collaborations and 147 partnerships resulting in social capital, good reputation nationally and internationally, and consumer 148 confidence. These non-monetary benefits are directly linked to the surveillance activity; their 149 valuation can be conducted using economic valuation methods (e.g. contingent valuation). 150
Surveillance benefits related to improved disease mitigation result from a combination of surveillance 151 and intervention measures. While surveillance provides information for management decisions, 152 intervention constitutes the process of implementing measures directed at mitigation. Together 153 surveillance and intervention achieve disease control and therefore loss avoidance, which constitutes 154 the final outcome of interest (Howe et al., 2013) . In this three variable relationship, surveillance and 155 intervention can be economic complements or substitutes. Surveillance and intervention resources as 156 complements are always used in a given ratio and can be considered to be one input, as for example 157 seen in a strategy that combines testing (surveillance) and culling (intervention). Surveillance and 158 intervention as substitutes means that using more of one input requires the use of less resources for 159 the other; the most prominent example here is early warning surveillance, where timely detection 160 enables a response at a time when the cumulative incidence and spread (and associated Further, they are expected to consider concerns of livestock holders and base their decisions on 209 scientific evidence. Thus, the resources invested reflect the value policy makers implicitly attribute to 210 the mitigation measures willingly paid to protect society from potential negative disease effects. 211
However, if one accepts that the utility of economic analysis consists in informing decisions, it is 212 necessary to understand and measure the relationships outlined above. An ex ante economic 213 appraisal provides important information for resource allocation decisions before the start of a 214
programme, an interim assessment shows whether the programme is on track and allows 215 implementing corrective measures, and an ex post analysis allows demonstrating the value realised. 216
Of course these phases of disease mitigation may not be so clear-cut in reality, but we believe they 217 help understand the different approaches from an economic perspective. Generally, economic 218 efficiency in diseases mitigation depends on the effectiveness of disease management. Therefore, 219
both economic and technical considerations should be included when evaluating surveillance. 220
Evaluation 221
Evaluation includes a systematic investigation of the worth or merit of a project or programme to 222 appraise its value or quality (Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation, 1994). It allows 223 assessing the effectiveness, efficiency and impact of a programme, creating an evidence base, 224 determining factors that lead to programme success or failure, identifying areas for programme 225 improvement, and providing justification for funding. As evaluation is a generic approach, each 226 discipline commonly has its own set of standardised evaluation metrics, approaches and methods that 227 may be of relevance. The evaluation of surveillance systems commonly assesses its effectiveness, efficiency, 235 implementation and/or compliance issues. The specific approach depends on the reasons for 236 evaluation, the client, the system under consideration, and how activities link to desired outcomes. 237
Once the evaluation questions are defined, relevant data are collected, analysed, interpreted and 238 recommendations made and communicated in a way appropriate to the target audience (HSCC, 2004) . Such guidelines offer some consensus in the broad steps to follow (i.e. description of the context and 252 evaluation process, implementation, and recommendations), but there currently remain gaps 253 including the lack of detailed implementation guidance, the absence of a comprehensive list of 254 attributes to be assessed, and a lack of advice for the selection of attributes and their assessment 255 (Calba et al., 2015 ) . Given the large variability of surveillance contexts, objectives, approaches and 256 designs, as well as differing interests of policy makers with regards evaluation outcomes, some degree 257 of flexibility in evaluation (guidelines) is needed to account for variations in evaluation question, 258 complexity, evaluation capacity, data and resource availability. 259
One aspect that is currently neglected or only treated superficially in such guidelines is the economic 260 evaluation of surveillance. Economics implies the recognition of scarcity and the best possible use of 261 the disposable resources. It is concerned with choices about the allocation of scarce resources to 262 satisfy peoples' needs with the aim to achieve a desired end by minimal use of resources or to 263 maximise a desired end under the given amount of resources. Consequently, there is always a choice 264 element attached to economic evaluation. It therefore requires a comparison of alternatives and 265 assessment of economic efficiency criteria which rely on the consideration of technical and economic 266 data. This is in stark contrast to performance or operational attributes that describe a surveillance 267 quality and can be assessed individually. 268
To make progress in the use of surveillance evaluation, the RISKSUR project (http://www.fp7-269 risksur.eu/) has developed an integrated theoretical framework and evaluation tool for the technical 270 and economic evaluation of surveillance. It guides the user through a series of steps and pathways to 271 help select the right evaluation question, attributes, criteria and methods to evaluate surveillance 272 systems or components. Countries may also have entered regional trade agreements which may define surveillance and 290 disease control activities at even more detailed level. In general, standards that focus on the output 291 of surveillance leave more flexibility for implementation and are therefore preferable. 292
For hazards that are not relevant to international trade or subject to international requirements, policy 293 setting is a domestic or industry (i.e. private) affair. This process will involve key stakeholders and -294 depending on the country's current practice -may have more or less government involvement. The 295 role of government will also depend on the economic relevance of the disease and the importance of 296 the affected livestock sector. Political processes such as lobbying by interest groups will also influence 297 whether a disease surveillance or control issue will be put on the agenda. Similarly, ongoing outbreaks, 298 risk of loss of international reputation, and imminent elections may all impact on whether a hazard 299 will or will not be of political interest. 300
Government involvement is typically increased for zoonoses. In this situation, policy development 301 tends to become more complicated because more than one ministry may be involved (Stärk et for improvements, savings and progress in disease control. Such evaluation should be an inherent part 366 of any policy and planned systematically, so that the necessary data and information can be collected 367 to allow for a sound assessment. 368 369
